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The Publication of National Security Information 
in the Digital Age 
Mary-Rose Papandrea* 
In one of her speeches on Internet freedom, Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton said that “[t]he fact that WikiLeaks used the internet is not 
the reason we criticized its actions.”1  Although Clinton is correct that it is 
essential to separate the technology WikiLeaks uses from its actions, the 
digital age has raised new concerns about the unauthorized dissemination of 
sensitive national security information.  New technology has made it much 
easier to leak and otherwise disseminate national security information.  At 
the same time, leaks continue to play an essential role in checking 
governmental power and often make invaluable contributions to our public 
debate.  WikiLeaks has prompted renewed debate concerning when the 
disclosure of national security information by nongovernmental actors 
should be protected, both as a policy matter and as a matter of constitutional 
law. 
One dominant theme in the discussion of how to strike the balance 
between an informed public and the need to protect legitimate national 
security secrets is whether new media entities like WikiLeaks are part of 
“the press” and whether Julian Assange and his cohorts are engaging in 
“journalism.”2  As the gathering and distribution of news and information 
becomes more widely dispersed, and the act of informing the public more 
participatory and collaborative, however, determining who is engaging in 
journalism and what constitutes the press has become increasingly difficult.  
It is not possible to draw lines based on the medium of communication, the 
journalistic background of the publisher, the editing process, the size of the 
audience, or the methods used to obtain the information. 
 
 
 *  Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.  The author thanks Noah C. N. 
Hampson for his invaluable research assistance. 
 1. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices 
and Challenges in a Networked World, Address at George Washington University (Feb. 15, 
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm. 
 2. See Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks, the First Amendment, and the Press, HARVARD 
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, Apr. 18, 2011, available at http://hlpronline.com/2011/04/ 
wikileaks-the-first-amendment-and-the-press/.  For a thorough summary of the 
government’s and mainstream media’s disdain for WikiLeaks and Julian Assange, see 
Yochai Benckler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://www. benkler.org/Benkler_Wikileaks_current.pdf. 
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Rather than attempt to define who is a journalist or what is the press, 
Congress and courts should give careful consideration to the relevant 
scienter requirements that would apply in cases involving nongovernmental 
actors.  In such cases, the relevant laws should require that the offender 
acted with a subjective intent to harm the United States or with reckless 
indifference to any such harm.  Such a test provides a means of protecting 
those who disseminate national security information responsibly and with a 
good-faith purpose to inform the public debate.  This intent requirement 
would be in addition to proof of imminent and serious harm to U.S. 
interests.3 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF LEAKS 
Throughout our nation’s history, democratic principles of open 
government have often clashed with the asserted need for secrecy in 
diplomatic and military affairs.  The executive branch enjoys virtually 
unbridled authority to control the flow of national security information to 
the public. The primary means by which the executive branch exercises this 
power is the classification system.4  The Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA)5 and whistleblower protection laws6 are ineffective checks on this 
power. FOIA provides a cumbersome and limited mechanism for obtaining 
national security information.7  Whistleblower protection laws can be 
confusing, and they provide minimal protection to employees who reveal 
national security information.8  Although it might be possible to provide 
better statutory checks on executive classification authority, it is doubtful 
that any statutory fix could resolve the endemic problem of 
overclassification.9 
As a result of the tension between the executive branch’s asserted need 
for secrecy and the democratic requirements of openness and transparency, 
the government and the media have engaged in a game of leaks.  Although 
 
 3. See Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks, the Proposed SHIELD Act, and the First 
Amendment, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 105 (2011). 
 4. For an excellent overview of the classification system and the problem of 
overclassification, see Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, U. 
ILL. L. REV. 881, 888-896 (2008). 
 5. 5 U.S.C. §552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-175, 121 Stat. 2524. 
 6. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
272, 112 Stat. 2413 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §403(q) (2006)); Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§2302 (2006)); Military Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102 
Stat. 2027 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §1034 (2006)). 
 7. Kitrosser, supra note 4, at 894. 
 8. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and 
National Security Information, 83 INDIANA L. J. 233, 246-248 (2008). 
 9. Kitrosser, supra note 4, at 896. 
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the media is often criticized for publishing national security information, its 
access to information frequently is the result of a planned strategy by a 
government official to advance or promote a particular policy, sabotage the 
plans or policies of rival agencies or political parties, discredit opponents, 
float a public opinion trial balloon, or expose corruption or illegal activities.  
Indeed, leaks have been part of this nation’s history since its founding and 
are an important way in which government officials promote their agendas 
and attempt to persuade the public.10  As the saying goes, the ship of state is 
the only known vessel that leaks from the top.  Thus, it is important to keep 
in mind that the executive branch does not want to end all leaks; it simply 
wants to end the leaks that it does not like.11  This is not to deny that some 
leaks come from self-styled patriots or disgruntled employees.  Regardless 
of the motivation of the leaker, however, these leaks also can make valuable 
contributions to the public debate. 
Leaks have played a key role in exposing illegal or morally 
reprehensible government practices, such as the treatment of prisoners in 
Abu Ghraib, extraordinary rendition, and the NSA warrantless wiretapping 
program.  Relying on leaks is hardly a perfect way of making sure the 
public receives essential information or of checking excessive government 
power; it does not guarantee that improperly classified information will 
come to light, or that genuinely sensitive information will remain secret.12 
Nevertheless, this imperfect system is the best we have for checking the 
virtually unbridled power of the government to control the dissemination of 
national security information. 
For at least the last century, it has generally been mainstream media 
outlets – especially the nation’s leading newspapers – that have published 
sensitive national security information.  For the most part, these entities 
have been both cooperative and responsible in their publication decisions.  
They routinely ask the government for guidance on the ramifications of the 
national security information in their possession and frequently have 
withheld stories or limited their scope in order to soften their impact.  For 
example, at President Kennedy’s request, The New York Times agreed to 
delay publishing a story about nuclear weapons in Cuba.13  During the Iran 
 
 10. For a thorough discussion of the history of intentional, strategic leaks, see 
Papandrea, supra note 8, at 249-262. 
 11. See Tom Wicker, Leak On, O Ship of State!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1982, at A15; 
see also LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF 
NEWSMAKING 145 (1973) (quoting aide to President Johnson as saying that “the people at 
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue are not really worried about all leaks – only those that originate 
outside the White House”). 
 12. See Louis Henkin, The Right To Know and the Duty To Withhold: The Case of the 
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 278 (1971). 
 13. MAX FRANKEL, HIGH NOON IN THE COLD WAR: KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 108-110 (2004). 
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hostage crisis, the press withheld stories that might have harmed the 
hostages or undermined secret negotiations for their release.14  In 1986, The 
Washington Post acceded to the White House’s request to refrain from 
publishing information about an underwater spy project in Russian waters 
called “Ivy Bells.”15  Famed journalist Benjamin Bradlee has said that while 
he was editor at the Post, he “kept many stories out of the paper because I 
felt – without any government pressure – that the national security would be 
harmed by their publication.”16  More recently, the Times sat on its NSA 
wiretapping story for a year while government officials argued for the 
necessity of keeping the program secret.17  Similarly, when the Post 
published an article revealing the existence of “black sites,” where terrorist 
suspects were secretly detained and interrogated18 it agreed to the 
government’s request to withhold the names of the Eastern European 
countries that were participating in the program.  To be sure, the 
government has not always agreed with the publication decisions of the 
mainstream media.  But newspapers and other news outlets in possession of 
national security information have generally made a serious effort to take 
the administration’s concerns seriously, and there is little evidence that any 
of their publication decisions have actually caused the United States serious 
harm. 
For decades this country has lived in a state of “benign indeterminancy” 
regarding the constitutionality of prosecutions for the receipt and 
dissemination of national security information.19  On the one hand, this state 
of affairs has served us well.  Major media outlets generally have been 
responsible in exercising a “gate-keeping” function, disseminating sensitive 
national security information only when the benefits of that dissemination 
outweigh the harm.  If anything, there has been more concern that the 
established press has not been as willing as new media to challenge 
government orthodoxy.20  On the other hand, we cannot assume that all 
 
 14. DEBORAH HOLMES, GOVERNING THE PRESS: MEDIA FREEDOM IN THE U.S. AND 
GREAT BRITAIN 61-62 (1986). 
 15. Richard Zoglin, Questions of National Security, TIME, June 2, 1986, at 67. 
 16. BENJAMIN BRADLEE, A GOOD LIFE: NEWSPAPERING AND OTHER ADVENTURES 474 
(1995). 
 17. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 18. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1. 
 19. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Act and Publication of 
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 (1973).  See also William H. Freivogel, 
Publishing National Security Secrets: The Case for Benign Indeterminacy, 3 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 95 (2010). 
 20. For a lengthier discussion of the failures of the mainstream media in recent years, 
see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 524-528 (2007). 
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journalists – whether professional or belonging to the new “citizen media” 
class – will continue to act responsibly. 
II.  NEW CHALLENGES 
The evolution of the Internet and the dispersal of the newsgathering and 
dissemination functions traditionally exercised by major media outlets have 
the potential to undermine this system of leaks that has been working rather 
well since the development of mass media over a century ago. 
Prior to the Internet, those in possession of national security 
information who wanted to reveal it to the public had to go through a 
traditional media outlet to accomplish that goal.  Thus, when Daniel 
Ellsberg was in possession of the Pentagon Papers, he went to several major 
newspapers as well as the three major television networks in an effort to 
find an outlet.21  Today’s leakers can deposit a treasure trove of information 
on any number of websites around the world designed to receive 
confidential information. Admittedly, Julian Assange of WikiLeaks 
cooperated with some of the world’s most influential newspapers in order 
to assure that the information he had collected would be noticed.  
Nevertheless, the government has good reason to be concerned that its 
enemies will not limit their reading to The New York Times and The 
Washington Post and instead will be searching the Internet for valuable 
information.  The Internet makes it easy to search vast databases with little 
effort. 
The government has never prosecuted the press for publishing national 
security information and has instead traditionally pursued the government 
employees or contractors who leaked the information in the first place.22 
Although the government has arrested Bradley Manning, the person 
identified as primarily responsible for the leak of U.S. classified 
information to WikiLeaks, it may not be so easy to identify leakers in the 
future.  Technology has developed to make it possible for individuals to 
exchange information anonymously, making it impossible for the 
 
 21. DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: THE STORY OF THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 127, 248 (1998).  Unlike the major newspapers, the networks were 
unwilling to publish the Pentagon Papers because they feared retaliation from the Federal 
Communications Commission. Id. at 127. 
 22. See Scott Shane, Obama Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to Press, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2010, at A1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/politics/12 
leak.html.  From time to time the government has also subpoenaed reporters to obtain the 
identity of individuals who leaked classified information.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Maria 
Newman, New York Times Reporter Jailed for Keeping Source Secret, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2005 (describing subpoenas for identities of confidential sources to reporters Matt Cooper 
and Judith Miller, and Miller’s being jailed for contempt of court for her refusal to comply), 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/06/politics/06cnd-leak.html?_r=1&page 
wanted=2. 
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government to subpoena the identity of leakers from the website that 
received the information.  Technology has given rise to the development of 
intermediaries like WikiLeaks that can serve as a conduit of information 
between the original sources and the public.  As Jay Rosen has noted, 
sources no longer have to meet a reporter in a dark parking garage.23 
Although new technology threatens the old way of doing things, we 
have to keep in mind that the traditional media outlets do not have a 
monopoly on the ability to inform the public in a responsible way. Non-
professional journalists have provided valuable information to the public 
debate that the mainstream media either missed or ignored.24  WikiLeaks 
itself has uncovered valuable information about human rights abuses and 
other atrocities in countries around the globe; in fact, in 2009, WikiLeaks 
won an award from Amnesty International for its release of documents 
concerning the extra-judicial killings and disappearances in Kenya.25  
Rather than condemning non-traditional media websites, we need to begin 
to recognize that new technology allows non-professionals to play an 
important role in informing the public. 
One common justification for distinguishing WikiLeaks from the 
traditional media is that it does not engage in the traditional journalistic 
practice of carefully analyzing and giving context to the material that it 
publishes.26  As a factual matter, it is inaccurate to argue that WikiLeaks 
does not engage in any editorial practices. Although initially WikiLeaks did 
not filter the electronic files it obtained, it no longer simply publishes every 
bit of information it receives.27  In addition, it has sought government 
guidance on what names and identifying information it should redact from 
its materials in order to avoid a significant risk of harm to individuals.28  
Furthermore, regardless of how WikiLeaks itself operates, it certainly is not 
 
 23. Jay Rosen, Jay Rosen on WikiLeaks: “The Watchdog Press Died; We Have This 
Instead,” VIMEO, Dec. 2, 2010, http://vimeo.com/17393373?utm_source=www.twitter. 
com%2Fstkonrath&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=future-of-journalism. 
 24. See Papandrea, supra note 20, at 524-528 (summarizing some of the contributions 
of bloggers and other online media outlets to the public discourse). 
 25. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Media Awards 2009: Winners 
and Shortlist (2009), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_20539.pdf. 
 26. See, e.g., David Rivkin & Bruce Brown, Prosecute Assange with Espionage Act, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/ 
forum/2010-12-15-column15_ST1_N.htm. 
 27. For a summary of the evolving modus operandi of WikiLeaks, see Yochai 
Benckler, supra note 2, at 4-14. 
 28. Letter from Julian Assange to U.S. Ambassador Louis B. Susman (Nov. 26, 2010), 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/101129_plugin-
Letter-to-US-Ambassador-from-Julian-Assange-26-November-2010.pdf.  State Department 
Legal Advisor Harold Koh wrote a stern letter to WikiLeaks flatly refusing to have any 
discussions about the sensitive material WikiLeaks possessed and demanding the immediate 
return of all documents that it possessed.  Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Jennifer 
Robinson, Attorney for Julian Assange (Nov. 27, 2010), available at http://media. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Dept_of_State_Assange_letter.pdf. 
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the case that every website would function in the same way. WikiLeaks was 
not the first website committed to transparency, and it is almost certainly 
not the last.29 
It is also true that the traditional media is capable of making 
irresponsible publication decisions and publishing national security 
information without due care and consideration. Indeed, during the debates 
leading to the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, Congress was 
concerned about “disloyal papers” that had loyalties to Germany or other 
enemies.30  In 1973, long before the Internet was developed, Harold Edgar 
and Benno Schmidt noted in their seminal article on the Espionage Act that 
“some underground newspaper stands ready to publish anything that the 
Times deems too sensitive to reveal.”31  Outrage over the publication of the 
identities of American operatives in books and magazines prompted the 
passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.32  In other 
words, concerns about publications with bad motives existed long before 
WikiLeaks came on the scene; these concerns do not depend on the medium 
of communication or whether “professional” journalists are the ones 
making the publication decisions. 
Another common argument for distinguishing WikiLeaks from the 
traditional media is that WikiLeaks stole its information, or solicited or 
encouraged sources to leak sensitive information.  In her speech on Internet 
freedom, Secretary of State Clinton maintained that “the WikiLeaks 
incident began with a theft, just as if it had been executed by smuggling 
papers in a briefcase.”33  The problem is that there is no evidence that 
WikiLeaks stole any documents. Vice President Joseph Biden similarly 
argued that there was a difference between WikiLeaks’ solicitation of 
classified information and the manner in which the traditional press 
acquires its information.34  This distinction does not hold up, especially 
given the absence of any public evidence that WikiLeaks or Julian Assange 
actively solicited classified information. Indeed, it appears that The New 
York Times, taking a page from WikiLeaks’ playbook, is considering 
 
 29. Cryptome was a predecessor to WikiLeaks. See Andrew Orlowski, WikiLeaks Are 
For-Hire Mercenaries – Cryptome, REGISTER, Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2010/12/07/cryptome_on_wikileaks/. GreenLeaks.com, GreenLeaks.org, and OpenLeaks.org 
are considered by some to be successors to WikiLeaks. See Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: The 
Next Generation of WikiLeaks, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/01/28/us-wikileaks-idUSTRE70R5A120110128. 
 30. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 19, at 965-966. 
 31. Id. at 1077. 
 32. 50 U.S.C. §§421-426 (2006). 
 33. Clinton, supra note 1. 
 34. Interview by David Gregory, host of Meet the Press, with Vice President Joseph 
Biden, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2010), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40720643 
/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts. 
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establishing a virtual “drop box” where members of the public could 
deposit documents anonymously.35  Several other organizations have 
already established portals for leaked information, including The Wall 
Street Journal36 and Al Jazeera.37 
The publication of national security secrets in a newspaper, magazine, 
or website may be as damaging to our national security interests as the 
transfer of secrets in the traditional espionage setting.38  We must assume 
that our enemies consume our public media just as we do theirs; given this, 
publication of a national security secret in a newspaper might cause even 
more harm because the whole world potentially can learn about it. 
Nevertheless, Congress has traditionally been concerned with the dilemma 
of protecting legitimate national security secrets without undermining the 
sort of public debate that is essential in a democracy.  Thus, when it was 
debating legislation that would become the Espionage Act of 1917, 
Congress rejected President Wilson’s proposal for broad authority to punish 
the publication of national defense information.39  The legislative history of 
the Espionage Act of 1917 “is replete with concern that these criminal 
statutes make use of appropriate standards of culpability to distinguish the 
morally innocent from the guilty.”40 
Congress has repeatedly recognized the importance of protecting 
legitimate criticism and examination of government actions every time it 
has amended the Espionage Act and related statutes.41  Although 
recognizing the need to protect national security secrets, Congress has been 
concerned about passing laws that would unduly restrict the media’s well-
intentioned disclosures.42  Thus, for example, in the debates surrounding the 
passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Congress 
repeatedly expressed concerns that any prohibitions on the disclosure of the 
identities of American agents should not cover academic studies of 
government programs and policies, or news media reporting of intelligence 
failures.43  Recognizing that even the disclosure of an agent’s identity could 
 
 35. Michael Calderone, NY Times Considers Creating an “EZ Pass Lane for 
Leakers,” YAHOO! NEWS, Jan. 25, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thecutline/2011 
0125/ts_yblog_thecutline/ny-times-considers-creating-an-ez-pass-lane-for-leakers. 
 36. See SafeHouse, https://www.wsjsafehouse.com/. 
 37. See About the Transparency Unit, http://transparency. aljazeera.net/. 
 38. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 19, at 934. 
 39. Id. at 940-941. 
 40. Id. at 1039. 
 41. Id. at 937 (noting that the Act’s “legislative debates, amendments and conferences 
. . . may fairly be read as excluding criminal sanctions for well-meaning publication of 
information no matter what damage to the national security might ensue and regardless of 
whether the publisher knew its publication would be damaging”). 
 42. Id. at 939. 
 43. Jerry J. Berman & Morton H. Halperin, The Agents Identities Protection Act: A 
Preliminary Analysis of the Legislative History, in FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 41, 51-52 (Paul Stephen ed., 1984). 
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be valuable, Congress provided that such disclosures are not actionable 
unless made with “reason to believe” that the disclosure would harm the 
United States, and that the disclosures were part of a “pattern or practice” of 
disclosure.44 
Although Congress has historically appeared interested in protecting 
the freedom of the press and limiting executive power to control the debate 
on national security and military affairs, the plain language of the 
Espionage Act points a “loaded gun” at those who report on such topics.45  
For example, Section 793(e) prohibits the dissemination or retention of 
national security information by those in “unauthorized possession” of it, 
and the only applicable mens rea requirement in cases involving tangible 
materials is that the dissemination or retention be “willful.”46  With respect 
to the dissemination or retention of nontangible “information pertaining to 
the national defense,” the government must prove that the offender has 
“reason to believe [the information] could be used to the injury of the 
United States or advantage a foreign nation.”47  Exactly what this provision 
requires is unclear.  Some lower courts have held that the government must 
show that the offender had a “bad faith purpose either to harm the United 
States or aid a foreign government,”48 but this construction is difficult to 
derive from the actual statutory language and arises from concerns that the 
phrase “national security information” would be unconstitutionally vague 
without it. 
III.  SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
Given that national security leaks play an important role in our 
democracy, Congress is faced with the difficult task of deciding under what 
circumstances the disclosure of national security information should be 
protected.  The foregoing section illustrated the difficulties of line-drawing 
based on the medium of communication, the journalistic background of the 
publisher, or complicity in the leak itself.  Instead of drawing lines on any 
of these bases, Congress should consider authorizing criminal sanctions 
against nongovernmental actors only in cases where the disclosure is made 
with an intent to harm the United States or with reckless indifference to any 
harm the disclosure would have. 
At the outset, Congress must make a clear distinction between 
government employees (and contractors) and those who do not have a 
position of trust and confidentiality with the government.  Very different 
 
 44. Id. at 51-52. 
 45. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 19, at 936. 
 46. 18 U.S.C. §793(e) (2006). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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policy considerations – as well as weaker First Amendment protections – 
apply in cases where individuals have obtained national security 
information as a result of a trusted relationship.  It may well be that even in 
such cases there should be protection for the disclosure of information that 
has been improperly classified, or for the exposure of illegal or fraudulent 
activity.49  In addition, it is appropriate to distinguish between the traditional 
espionage setting, where a government employee exposes secrets to a 
foreign power, and other circumstances in which the employee acts with the 
purpose of revealing information to the general public.50 
Very different considerations come into play when deciding whether to 
criminalize the disclosure of national security information by third parties 
who did not obtain national security information as a result of a trusted 
relationship with the government.  Although the legal landscape is unclear, 
the First Amendment arguably provides protection for the dissemination of 
any information that does not threaten grave, direct, and unavoidable harm 
to the United States.51 
First, Congress should consider amending the Espionage Act to make 
clear what kind of information is covered by its provisions.  Currently some 
of the Act’s provisions apply to “information relating to the national 
defense.”  This category is vague and encompasses a potentially limitless 
universe of information.  Instead, with respect to third parties who obtain 
unauthorized access to information, Congress should be specific about what 
information is subject to criminal sanctions.  This has been the approach 
Congress has taken in more recent legislation, such as the Intelligence 
Identities Protection Act of 1982, which prohibits the identification of 
covert agents.52 
Second, once Congress has identified specific topics that are especially 
sensitive, it should include rigorous culpability requirements.  Determining 
the requisite level of intent is essential in drafting any criminal statute.  In 
the criminal law context, the very same conduct may face dramatically 
different sanctions depending upon the intent of the actor.  The same is true 
in the context of prosecutions based on the dissemination of national 
security information.  The Espionage Act and related statutes contain a 
hodge-podge of intent standards that are hard to understand and difficult to 
apply. 
 
 
 49. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy v. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. 
& POL. REV. 185, 196 (2007). 
 50. The leading case involving a government employee who disclosed classified 
information to the press is United States v. Morison, in which the court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the Espionage Act is limited to the classic spying scenario but 
noted that the Act does permit heavier penalties for traditional espionage.  See 844 F.2d 
1057, 1065 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 51. See Stone, supra note 49, at 202. 
 52. 50 U.S.C. §§421-426 (2006). 
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The dissemination of information by nongovernment actors should be 
punishable only if the offender acted with the intent to harm the United 
States or with reckless indifference to such harm.  This sort of intent 
standard would provide protection for all responsible publishers acting in 
good faith, no matter who they are or what medium they use for 
communication. Such a standard is similar to the “actual malice” standard 
the Supreme Court adopted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.53 There, the 
Court held that given “a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”54 
strict liability for the publication of false defamatory information about 
public officials would have a severe chilling effect on the press, which 
would be sure to make only statements that “steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone.”
55
  While recognizing that false defamatory speech can cause real 
harm to reputation, the Court determined that a public official can recover 
only if he demonstrates that the defendant published “with knowledge that 
[the speech] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”56  Just as the damage to our national security interests is the same 
regardless of the intent of the disseminator, the damage to a public official’s 
reputation occurs regardless of the motivation of a defendant in a 
defamation action.  Nevertheless, an intent requirement in both 
circumstances serves as an important way of promoting vigorous public 
debate while preserving the government’s ability to act in the most 
egregious situations. 
To be clear, this intent requirement does not turn on the motivation for 
disclosure.  Even the most esteemed newspapers are driven in part by 
profit-seeking motives to increase circulation, just as some government 
employees engaged in traditional espionage do it for the money, not to 
harm the United States.  Of course these sorts of pecuniary motivations 
might make it more difficult for a defendant to demonstrate that he was not 
recklessly indifferent to the harm the disclosure might cause, but they do 
not by themselves constitute intent to harm the United States or to aid our 
enemies. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of a robust scienter requirement should not 
replace other important necessary elements.  Proof of imminent and serious 
harm to U.S. interests must be demonstrated in addition to subjective intent 
to harm the United States.  As Geoffrey Stone has persuasively argued, it 
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment to permit 
nongovernmental actors to be punished for the dissemination of national 
 
 53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 54. Id. at 270. 
 55. Id. at 279. 
 56. Id. at 279-280. 
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security information that does not in fact threaten imminent and serious 
harm.57 
CONCLUSION 
When considering whether and how to amend the Espionage Act and 
related statutes, Congress must keep in mind the important role that the 
press has played in our democracy throughout its history.  In order to 
protect this vital function, it will be necessary at times to permit the 
publication of sensitive national security information that causes real harm.  
What is not necessary, however, is to protect the publication of such 
information if it is done with the intent to harm the United States – or aid its 
enemies – or with reckless disregard to any harm the publication will cause. 
To be sure, an intent requirement will not give the government the sort of 
control it might like over the information that is disseminated in the media, 
professional or otherwise.  It is true that a stringent intent requirement 
would permit the press to publish information that might be useful to our 
enemies.  But, as Congress has noted in its prior debates, this is the price we 
must pay in order to protect free debate.  This approach places the burden 
squarely on the government to work harder to prevent and isolate leaks of 
national security information for which secrecy is essential. 
 
 
 57. See Stone, supra note 3, at 114-115. 
